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Abstract
We develop and defend a new approach to counterlogicals. Non-vacuous
counterlogicals, we argue, fall within a broader class of counterfactuals known
as counterconventionals. Existing semantics for counterconventionals (devel-
oped by Einheuser (2006) and Kocurek et al. (2020)) allow counterfactuals to
shift the interpretation of predicates and relations. We extend these theories to
counterlogicals by allowing counterfactuals to shift the interpretation of logical
vocabulary. This yields an elegant semantics for counterlogicals that avoids
problems with the usual impossible worlds semantics. We conclude by show-
ing how this approach can be extended to counterpossibles more generally.
1 The Difficult Question
Cohen (1990, p. 131) asked a difficult question:
(1) If the failure of modus ponens implied the failure of modus tollens, and
modus ponens were to fail, would modus tollens fail too?
It seems we could go either way. On the one hand, modus ponens is exactly the
form of reasoning whose validity is being denied in the antecedent of (1). So to
answer affirmatively seems to require reasoning with the very inference rule we are
supposing to be invalid. On the other hand, modus ponens is actually valid. So a
negative answer to (1) would constitute an actual counterexample to a seemingly
valid form of counterfactual reasoning, viz., the schema ((φÑ ψ)^ φ) ψ.
The question is hard because the antecedent of this counterfactual is, in a broad
sense, logically impossible. Such counterfactuals are known as counterlogicals,
and they are the topic of this paper. Some other examples:
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(2) If Francewere both amonarchy and not amonarchy, the revolutionistswould
be very confused.
(3) If the Liar sentence were both true and not true, the moon would be made
of green cheese.
(4) IfAristotlewerenot self-identical, his argument for the lawofnon-contradiction
in Metaphysics Gammawould have failed.
Our question is this: Do counterlogicals like these have non-trivial truth condi-
tions? And if so, what are they? In other words, what is the correct semantics for
counterlogicals?
There is disagreement in the counterfactuals literature on this question. On the
one hand, examples such as (1)–(4) suggest that the truth conditions of counter-
logicals are not trivial: some seem true, others false, and for others it is hard to
say. That suggests that they do not all mean the same thing. On the other hand,
it is unclear how to reason under a logically impossible counterfactual supposition
without leading to a trivializing explosion. As Lewis (1973, p. 24) famously put it,
“Confronted by an antecedent that is not really an entertainable supposition, one
may react by saying, with a shrug: If that were so, anything you like would be
true!”
We will develop and defend a middle ground. Counterlogicals have non-trivial
truth conditions, but only insofar as they are interpreted as counterconventionals—
insofar, that is, as their antecedents trigger a shift in the meanings of the logical
vocabulary in the consequent. So when a counterlogical receives a non-trivial
reading, it is because words like ‘not’, ‘or’, and so on get reinterpreted according to
another logic. As a result, its antecedent ends up expressing a completely coherent
proposition. Without such a convention shift, counterlogicals are vacuous. So there
is a kernel of truth on both sides of existing debate—a kernel which we preserve
while discarding the concomitant husks.
Here is an outline of what is to come. We start by reviewing the standard
impossible worlds semantics for counterlogicals, where counterfactuals range over
logically impossible worlds (§2). We observe that this semantics is prone to a
Quinean “changing the subject” objection: seemingly non-vacuous counterlogicals
really just involve changing themeaning of the logical vocabulary (§3). In response,
we propose to treat non-vacuous counterlogicals as counterconventionals, which
shift the conventions used to interpret their constituents. This phenomenon also
occurs in non-logical examples (§4).
Our proposal is motivated by the view—inspired by Carnap (1937) and Ayer
(1952), and recently defended by Kouri Kissel (2018, 2019)—that disputes over logic
aremetalinguistic negotiations (§5). We call this view logical expressivism. It holds
that claims about logical validity are expressions of the logical commitments of the
speaker, rather than factual assertions about the world. In this spirit, we extend the
expressivist semantics for counterconventionals developed by Einheuser (2006) and
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Kocurek et al. (2020) to allow counterfactuals to shift the interpretation of logical
vocabulary (§6). This yields an elegant, unified, and well-behaved semantics for
counterlogicals that does not fall prey to the Quinean objection. We conclude
by suggesting that this view of counterlogicals extends to counterpossibles more
generally (§7). Some technical results are proved in a brief appendix (§A).
A quick note before we get started. We assume throughout that our background
logic is classical. Thus, as a first pass, a counterfactual is a counterlogical iff the
negation of its antecedent is classically valid. This is largely for ease of exposition;
our framework is easily adaptable to non-classical background logics (see §6).
2 Impossible Worlds Semantics
Counterlogicals are often considered a subspecies of counterpossibles, i.e., counter-
factuals with impossible antecedents.1 Here are some purported counterpossibles
that are not counterlogicals:
(5) If water were hydrogen peroxide, life would not exist.
(6) If Sam were a salmon, she would have wings.
(7) If Socrates had existed without his singleton, he would be sad.
There are two main views about the truth conditions of counterpossibles. Accord-
ing to vacuism, counterpossibles all have vacuous truth conditions.2 Vacuism is
predicted by the standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals. On this
semantics, a counterfactual of the form φ ψ is true iff all the closest possible
worlds where φ is true are worlds where ψ is true. So if there are no possible
worlds where φ is true, it is trivially the case that “all” of the closest such worlds
are worlds where ψ is true. Hence, the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics validates the
following principle:
Vacuism. ¬◇φ ( φ ψ.
Because it is a consequence of the orthodox theory of counterfactuals, vacuism is
considered the orthodox position on counterpossibles.
1There are exceptions involving indexical vocabulary such as “actually”. On some natural notions
of logical consequence, φ ” @φ is a logical truthwhile◻(φ ” @φ) is not. In that case, counterfactuals
of the form (φ ^ ¬@φ) ψ would technically be counterlogicals but not counterpossibles. Such
counterfactuals do not raise any serious problems for the standard theories of counterfactuals in the
literature, though: a simple two-dimensional semantics can easily explain why (φ ^ ¬@φ) ψ is
not vacuous. For now, we ignore these cases and continue to treat counterlogicals as counterpossibles.
2Popper (1959) is perhaps one of the first to defend this view (also in Popper 2005, p. 461), though
the view is predominantly associated with Lewis (1973, pp. 24–25). Other contemporary defenders of
this view include Lycan (2001); Bennett (2003); Emery and Hill (2016); Williamson (2007, 2017). Lewis
(1973, pp. 25–26) notes the possibility of a vacuist view on which all counterpossibles are vacuously
false. Vetter (2016) defends an intermediate position, on which counterpossibles are vacuously true
unless they are given an epistemic interpretation.
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Yet the tides are turning: non-vacuism, the view that some counterpossibles
have non-vacuous truth conditions, has gained converts.3 One of its primary virtues
is that it accords with our intuitive judgments. We do not judge each of (5)–(7) the
same way, even when we know their antecedents are impossible: (5) seems true, (6)
seems false, and (7) could be true or false depending on Socrates’s psychology.
Vacuists have responded with a number of pragmatic explanations of these
judgments.4 But there is a relatively straightforward semantic explanation available
to non-vacuists. We simply need to enrich the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics with
impossible worlds, which can be represented as sets of sentences, viz., the sentences
that are true at those impossibleworlds. On this semantics, φψ is true just in case
all the closest worlds where φ is true—whether or not those worlds are possible—
are worlds where ψ is true. This allows counterpossibles to be non-vacuous while
preserving much of the spirit of the orthodox semantics.
Here is how thatwould go in a bitmoredetail.5 The languageL of this semantics
can be summarized in Backus-Naur form as follows:
φ F p | ¬φ | (φ ^ φ) | (φ _ φ) | (φÑ φ) | ◻φ | ◇φ | (φ φ).
An impossible worlds model is a tuple of the form I  〈W, P, f ,V〉, where W is
a non-empty set of worlds, P Ď W is a non-empty set of possible worlds (thus we
define I B (W ´ P) as the set of impossible worlds), f : ℘ (W) ˆ W Ñ ℘ (W) is a
selection function, and V is a valuation function, mapping every atomic sentence p
and possible world w P P to either 0 or 1, and every formula φ and impossible
world w P I to either 0 or 1. The satisfaction relation ,i is defined as follows. If
w P I, then I , w ,i φ iff V(φ, w)  1. If w P P, then ,i is defined recursively:
I , w ,i p ô V(p ,w)  1
I , w ,i ¬φ ô I ,w .i φ
I , w ,i φ ^ ψ ô I ,w ,i φ and I , w ,i ψ
I , w ,i φ _ ψ ô I , w ,i φ or I , w ,i ψ
I , w ,i φÑ ψ ô I , w ,i φ only if I , w ,i ψ
I , w ,i ◻φ ô for all v P P: I , v ,i φ
I , w ,i ◇φ ô for some v P P: I , v ,i φ
I , w ,i φ ψ ô for all v P f (~φI ,w): I , v ,i ψ,
where ~φI B {w P W | I , w ,i φ }. Consequence is the preservation of satisfac-
tion at possibleworlds: Γ (i φ iff for every impossible worldsmodelI  〈W, P, f ,V〉
3Downing (1959) is an early critic of vacuism. Other non-vacuists include Cohen (1987, 1990);
Mares (1997); Nolan (1997); Goodman (2004); Vander Laan (2004); Kim and Maslen (2006); Krakauer
(2012); Brogaard and Salerno (2013); Kment (2014); Bernstein (2016); Jenny (2016); Berto et al. (2018).
4See Emery and Hill 2016; Vetter 2016; Williamson 2017.
5Our presentation of this semantics roughly follows that of Berto et al. 2018 with some minor
changes. See also French et al. 2020.
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and every w P P, if I , w ,i Γ, then I ,w ,i φ. This guarantees that (i obeys all of
the laws of classical logic (in fact, S5).
The non-vacuist maywant to place constraints on f tomake the truth conditions
for counterfactuals more realistic. Some common constraints include:
Success. f (X, w) Ď X.
Weak Centering. If w P X, then w P f (X, w).
Strangeness of Impossibility. If X X P ,H, then f (X, w) Ď P.
These constraints correspond respectively to the following principles:6
Identity. ( φ φ.
Modus Ponens. φ ψ, φ ( ψ.
Necessity Condition. ◇φ, ◻ψ ( φ ψ.
Though some of these principles may seem plausible, they are contested even
amongst non-vacuists. So we will not impose them for the sake of neutrality.7
By contrast, Vacuism corresponds to a relatively strong requirement, viz., that
impossible worlds are never close:
No Close Impossibilities. If X X P H, then f (X, w) H.
Thus, the standard vacuist semantics can be viewed as a special case of the more
general impossible worlds semantics.
There is certainly more to say about this debate. But we find the semantic
explanation provided by non-vacuists to be simple, elegant, and plausible. So for
now, we will table this debate and simply assume non-vacuism is true (though we
return to this issue in §7).
Even amongst non-vacuists, there is disagreement over counterlogicals. Aswith
counterpossibles, there seem to be twomain views, thoughwedo not knowof an es-
tablished name for either. According to what we will call counterlogical vacuism,
counterlogicals all have vacuous truth conditions, even though counterpossibles
generally do not.8 According to what we will call counterlogical non-vacuism,
counterlogicals, like other counterpossibles, do not all have vacuous truth condi-
tions.9
6See French et al. 2020 for details. While they assume impossible worlds are logically consistent
and maximal, at least these correspondence results carry over to our more general setting.
7For instance, Nolan (1997, p. 555) suggests that ‘if nothing were true, nothing would be true’ is a
potential counterexample to ( φ φ. Moreover, there are well-known counterexamples to modus
ponens independently of counterpossibles; see, e.g., Briggs 2012.
8Defenders of counterlogical vacuism include Downing (1959); Goodman (2004); Kment (2014).
9Defenders of counterlogical non-vacuism include Cohen (1987, 1990); Mares (1997); Nolan (1997);
Vander Laan (2004); Kim and Maslen (2006); Krakauer (2012); Brogaard and Salerno (2013); Berto
et al. (2018).
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Counterlogical vacuists will need to modify the impossible worlds semantics so
as to rule out logically impossible worlds from the models without ruling out all
impossible worlds. To do this, they will restrict the class of models to those where
V determines the truth value of φ at impossible worlds in a logically coherent
manner. There are many ways to do this,10 but however they do it, they will want
the following principle to be validated (without validating Vacuism):
Counterlogical Vacuism. If ( ¬φ, then ( φ ψ.
Counterlogical non-vacuists may accept the impossible worlds semantics as it
stands. Since truth at impossible worlds is determined solely by the valuation
function V , and since there are no constraints on how V may assign truth values to
formulas at impossible worlds, impossible worlds models can contain worlds that
are logically impossible. So the impossibleworlds semantics already accommodates
non-vacuous counterlogicals (though perhaps there are other modifications they
would make).11
At first glance, our intuitive judgments seem to support counterlogical non-
vacuism. We do not judge each of (2)–(4) the same way: (2) seems true, (3) seems
false, and (4) seems to depend on the correct interpretation ofAristotle’sMetaphysics
Gamma. Again, wemight try to explain these judgments via pragmaticmechanisms.
But the impossible worlds semantics already provides a simple, elegant, and plau-
sible explanation for the apparent non-vacuity of counterlogicals. If we are already
willing to tolerate non-vacuous counterpossibles, then as a default, we ought to
tolerate non-vacuous counterlogicals as well unless there were a strong reason not
to.
3 Changing the Subject
Yet there is a strong reason to think counterlogicals are semantically vacuous even
if other counterpossibles are not.
Consider the following example:
(8) If intuitionistic logic were the correct logic, then either the continuum hy-
pothesis would be true or it would not be true.
10Here is one suggestion. Where I  〈W, P, f ,V〉, say w P W is coherent in I if (i)
{φ P L | I , w ,i φ } *i K, (ii) for each φ P L, eitherI , w ,i φ orI , w ,i ¬φ, and (iii)I , w ,i φψ
iff f (~φI , w) Ď ~ψI for all φ, ψ P L. Say I itself is coherent if w is coherent in I for all w P I.
Intuitively, coherent models are ones where every impossible world is the possible world of some
model. We can then restrict consequence to the class of coherent models satisfying Success.
11Some counterlogical non-vacuists may want to impose a variant of Strangeness of Impossibility:
Strangeness of Inconsistency. If* ¬φ and ψ1 , . . . , ψn ( χ, then φ ψ1 , . . . , φ ψn ( φ χ.
In terms of closeness of worlds, this says that every logically consistent world is closer than every
logically inconsistent world (though only roughly; more precisely, this says that if every closest φ-
world satisfies the premises of a valid argument, where φ is logically consistent, then every closest
φ-world satisfies its conclusion). We will not take a stand on Strangeness of Inconsistency here.
6
3 Changing the Subject
Presumably, the counterlogical non-vacuist will maintain that (8) is a false coun-
terlogical if there ever was one.12 After all, intuitionistic logic rejects the law of
excluded middle. Since the continuum hypothesis is undecidable, it is a counterex-
ample to the law of excluded middle in intuitionistic set theory.
But one might object that this temptation to call (8) false reflects a use-mention
error. Recall a familiar point due to Kripke (1971, 1980): when we evaluate truth
at a counterfactual scenario, we use our language, not the language adopted by
speakers in that scenario. Thus, a world where speakers use the names ‘Hesperus’
and ‘Phosphorus’ to refer to distinct objects is not a world where Hesperus is
Phosphorus; it is a world where people speak differently. So while (9a) is false, (9b)
is true:
(9) a. If people had used ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ to refer to different
objects, the sentence ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ would be true.
b. If people had used ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ to refer to different
objects, Hesperus would be Phosphorus.
Since we are using ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ in the consequent of (9b), those
terms refer to whatwe actually refer to by them, viz., Venus. And since Venus would
still be self-identical if people had spoken differently, (9b) is true.
Similarly, in (8), we are using the words ‘not’ and ‘or’ in the consequent, not
mentioning them. True, in a world governed by intuitionistic logic, people would
use the words ‘not’ and ‘or’ in such a way so as not to validate the law of excluded
middle. That is, the following counterfactual might be false:
(10) If intuitionistic logic were the correct logic, then the sentence ‘Either the
continuum hypothesis is true or it is not true’ would be true.
That is irrelevant, however: when we describe what is true at a counterfactual
scenario, we describe it in our language, not the language of these hypothetical
speakers. And since (let’s suppose) we use ‘not’ and ‘or’ in a way that is governed
by the law of excluded middle, a world where intuitionistic logic is correct is still a
world where either the continuum hypothesis is true or it is not true. So unless we
are changing the meaning of ‘not’ and ‘or’ in (8), it is true.
The same goes for any apparently non-vacuous counterlogical. Consider (3):
12Wemaywant to distinguish counterfactuals such as (2) and (3), whose antecedents have a logically
inconsistent form (φ^¬φ), from counterfactuals such as (1) and (8), whose antecedents do not have a
logically inconsistent form but express ametalogical falsehood, e.g., about the laws of logic. The latter
class of counterfactuals might be more accurately labeled countermetalogicals. For discussion of this
distinction, see Williamson 2017; Sandgren and Tanaka 2019. For ease of exposition, we continue
to talk about countermetalogicals as though they are counterlogicals. As it turns out, countermeta-
logicals may be counterlogicals under certain formulations, e.g., with propositional quantifiers. For
instance, if we formalized the law of excluded middle as ∀p◻(p _ ¬ p), then ¬∀p◻(p _ ¬ p) q
would be a counterlogical, since ∀p◻(p _ ¬ p) is valid on the standard semantics for modal logic
with propositional quantifiers (Fine, 1970).
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(3) If the Liar sentence were both true and not true, the moon would be made
of green cheese.
At first, this seems false, since a world where the Liar sentence is both true and
not true is a world where the principle of explosion fails, and so not everything
would be true. But what kind of world are we describing here? After all, we are not
mentioning ‘not’ and ‘and’ in (3); we are using them. Following Kripke, then, the
antecedent of (3) is interpreted according to how we use the terms ‘not’ and ‘and’.
If we interpret those words classically, the antecedent of (3) must be interpreted
classically. And on that interpretation, the world being described by the antecedent
makes no sense, just as it makes no sense to say that (literally, strictly speaking, in
one and the same sense) that France is a monarchy and France is not a monarchy.
It is literally incoherent: we cannot comprehend what such an absurd world is like.
So either ‘not’ and ‘and’ do not have their classical meanings in (3)—in which case,
its antecedent is not really logically impossible, in the classical sense—or (3) is
vacuously true since contradictions imply everything.
We can bring out the objection by making explicit that we are interpreting the
connectives in the antecedent classically. Contrast (3) with:
(11) If the Liar sentence were both true and not true according to a classical
interpretation of negation and conjunction, the moon would be made of
green cheese.
Unlike (3), we find it hard to deny (11). It is just part of the meaning of classical
negation and conjunction that everything follows from a conjunction of a sentence
and its negation. To deny (11) is not to deny classical logic but to simply fail
to understand what classical logic is. If that is right, then the antecedents of
counterlogicals such as (3) are not describing scenarios where contradictions are
true under a classical interpretation.13
This argument seems specific to counterlogicals: it does not obviously generalize
to all counterpossibles. Consider, for example:
(12) If water were hydrogen peroxide, life would go on as usual.
(12) seems false since hydrogen peroxide is toxic. Unlike with counterlogicals, the
false reading of (12) does not seem to rely on a shift in the meaning of ‘water’,
‘hydrogen peroxide’, or ‘life’—using those words as we actually use them, (12) still
seems false. So this argument may give us a reason to think counterlogicals really
are vacuous without thereby giving us a reason to think all counterpossibles are
(though we think it still might; see §7).
This objection is reminiscent of the “changing the subject” objection against non-
classical logics due to Quine (1970). Quine held that whenever the non-classical
13This distinction is similar to the distinction due to Sandgren and Tanaka (2019) between logically
different worlds and worlds containing logical violations. We return to this point in §6.
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logician denies some law of classical logic, they end up talking about different
logical operations than the classical logician is talking about. To demonstrate this,
Quine asks us to consider a fictitious city—call it “Deviantsville”—whose denizens
speak a language like English except their use of ‘and’ and ‘or’ is non-standard.
According to the denizens of Deviantsville:
(φ and ψ) &D φ φ $D (φ and ψ)
(φ and ψ) &D ψ ψ $D (φ and ψ)
(φ or ψ) $D φ φ &D (φ or ψ)
(φ or ψ) $D ψ ψ &D (φ or ψ).
Clearly what is happening here is that denizens of Deviantsville are using the word
‘and’ to mean disjunction (i.e., what we mean by ‘or’) and ‘or’ to mean conjunc-
tion (i.e., what we mean by ‘and’). It would be silly to characterize the denizens
of Deviantsville as employing a highly non-classical logic in which conjunction
elimination fails, where disjunctions entail their disjuncts, and so on.
Quine held that this is essentially what the non-classical logician is doing, al-
beit in disguise. The intuitionist uses the words ‘not’ and ‘or’ much like classical
logicians, but those words in the intuitionist’s mouth do not mean what classical
logiciansmean by them. It is just part of what ‘not’ and ‘or’ mean that they obey the
law of excluded middle. “Here, evidently,” Quine says, “is the deviant logician’s
predicament: when he tries to deny the doctrine he only changes the subject.”
The same could be said of the counterlogical non-vacuist: they are just changing
the subject. When they point to counterfactuals such as (8) as examples of non-
vacuous counterlogicals, they are implicitly reinterpreting the logical connectives
according to a non-classical logic in order to make sense of the antecedent. But
that says nothing about these antecedents on their original, classical interpreta-
tion. Holding fixed what we mean by the logical connectives, (8) is true. And the
same could be said about all counterlogicals. When a counterlogical appears non-
vacuous, the speaker is implicitly reinterpreting the logical vocabulary to conform
to the logic suggested by the antecedent.
To foreshadow our own approach to counterlogicals, we agree with Quine that
the intuitionist and the classicist mean something different when they use ‘not’ and
‘or’. As a consequence, (8) only receives a non-vacuous interpretation when we
implicitly reinterpret the logical connectives. That does not mean, however, that
the intuitionist “changes the subject” or that counterlogicals are vacuous. Instead,
the subject matter of these disputes is precisely over which meanings to adopt and
counterlogicals reveal the effects of different conventional choices.
4 Counterconventionals
Over the next few sections, we present our positive proposal of counterlogicals. In
short, our proposal is to treat non-vacuous counterlogicals as counterconventionals,
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which can shift the conventional interpretation of expressions in their scope.
Counterconventionals arise most naturally in conversational contexts where
speakers disagree over how to use specific words or phrases. Such disagreements
are known as metalinguistic negotiations.14 Very roughly, a metalinguistic negoti-
ation is a dispute over what counts as what as opposed to what things are like.
Here is an example. In 2006, the International Astronomical Union (IAU) de-
cided to redefine the word ‘planet’ so as to require all planets to “clear their orbital
neighborhood” (meaning they had to be significantly more massive than any other
object in their orbit). This was because astronomers discovered a number of planet-
like objects (Ceres, Eris, Haumea, and Makemake) and were worried that future
astronomical discoverieswould lead to an explosion in the number of planets. Since
Pluto does not clear its orbital neighborhood (its orbit crosses Neptune’s), it was
reclassified as a dwarf planet. Similarly for these other planet-like objects. This
caused an outcry amongst the public. People were outraged that their beloved
Pluto was no longer considered a planet. Even amongst the scientific community,
there was disagreement over whether this was the right decision.
Now, consider the following dialogue (adapted from Kocurek et al. (2020)):
(13) Alpha: Pluto is a planet.
Beta: No it’s not. Pluto is not a planet because it does not clear its orbital
neighborhood.
Alpha: I don’t accept the IAU’s definition! Pluto is a planet, I don’t care
what the IAU says.
Beta: Look, I know that you think that Pluto is a planet, but there’s a
good reason the IAU disagrees. If Pluto were a planet, Ceres, Eris,
Haumea, Makemake, and many other objects would be planets, too.
Clearly, Alpha and Beta are not disagreeing over the shape of Pluto’s orbit or
whether it crosseswithNeptune’s. Rather, they are disagreeing over how to classify
Pluto. Alpha is, in some sense, advocating for classifying Pluto as a planet whereas
Beta is advocating for the IAU’s classification. So (13) is ametalinguistic negotiation.
Notice that Beta’s last response here took the form of a counterfactual:
(14) If Pluto were a planet, Ceres, Eris, Haumea, Makemake, and many other
objects would be planets, too.
There are two ways of reading (14). One reading of (14) is something like: if Pluto
had cleared its orbital neighborhood, so would Ceres, Eris, and so on. On this
reading, (14) is clearly false: a correction to Pluto’s orbit so that it clears its orbital
neighborhoodwould not (wemay suppose) lead to a similar correction in the orbits
of all these other objects.




But intuitively, this is not what Beta was trying to say. Rather, they were saying
that if Pluto were classified as a planet, Ceres, Eris, etc. would be too. On this
reading, (14) is true, and indeed, captures exactly the consideration that led IAU to
redefine ‘planet’ in the first place.
Following Einheuser (2006), we call the first reading of (14) the countersub-
stratum reading and the second reading the counterconventional reading. On the
countersubstratum reading of counterfactuals, we hold fixed the conventions used
to interpret language and vary reality (the “substratum”), whereas on the counter-
conventional reading, it is the reverse. So on the countersubstratum reading of (14),
we hold fixed the meaning of ‘planet’ and consider a world where Pluto’s orbit is
different, whereas on the counterconventional reading, we hold fixed Pluto’s orbit
but reinterpret ‘planet’ by dropping the orbital neighborhood condition.
Other examples illustrating the distinction:
(15) a. If Secretariat were an athlete, the world’s fastest athletes would all be
horses.
b. If pizza were a vegetable, our children would not be any healthier.
c. If Game of Thrones were a comedy, it would be quite a dark comedy.
Each of these sentences has a (true) counterconventional reading and a (false)
countersubstratum reading. On the former reading, we hold fixed the intrinsic
properties of the objects involved (Secretariat, pizza, Game of Thrones) and change
what is meant by the target word (‘athlete’, ‘vegetable’, ‘comedy’). On the latter
reading, we hold fixed the meanings of the target words but vary the intrinsic
properties of the objects involved.
Counterconventionals are what Einheuser calls c-monsters, i.e., convention-
shifting expressions.15 Other examples of c-monsters include tense, attitude verbs,
and dependency verbs. To illustrate with the Pluto example:
(16) a. Pluto used to be a planet, but it isn’t any more.
b. Alpha thinks Pluto is a planet.
c. Whether or not Pluto is a planet depends on what definition the mem-
bers of the IAU agree on.
Each of these sentences has a (true) convention-shifting reading and a (false)
substratum-shifting reading. On the true, convention-shifting reading, the sen-
tences concern how Pluto is classified; e.g., on this reading, (16a) says that Pluto’s
classification changed over time. On the false, substratum-shifting reading, the
sentences concern Pluto’s physical properties; e.g., on this reading, (16a) effectively
says that Pluto’s orbit changed over time.
There are even expressions like ‘according to’ or ‘in x’s sense’ that seem to only
15This term is inspired by the notion of a monster from Kaplan 1977. In brief, whereas a monster
is context-shifting expression, a c-monster is (in Kaplan’s terms) a character-shifting expression.
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shift conventions, lacking a substratum-shifting reading altogether:16
(17) a. According to Alpha’s definition of ‘planet’, Pluto is a planet.
b. Pluto is a planet in Alpha’s sense.
Thus, convention-shifting occurs in a wide variety of embedding expressions, not
just counterfactuals.
To make these ideas more concrete, we sketch a semantics for counterconven-
tionals due to Einheuser (2006) and Kocurek et al. (2020). The key idea is to intro-
duce a shiftable convention parameter into indices of evaluation.17 The convention
parameter is essentially an interpretation function, assigning intensions (functions
fromworlds to extensions) to the non-logical vocabulary of the language. Counter-
factuals are c-monsters when they shift this convention parameter.18
Let’s spell this out inmore detail. Where W is a set of worlds, a hyperconvention
overW is a function c : AtÑ ℘ (W)mapping each atomic sentence to a set ofworlds.
An index over W is a pair 〈w , c〉 where w P W and c is a hyperconvention over W .
We let IW be the set of all indices over W . A conventional model is a pair C  〈W, f 〉
where W , H is a set of worlds and f : ℘ (IW ) ˆ IW Ñ ℘ (IW ) is the selection
function. As before, we may impose constraints on f if desired. The satisfaction
relation ,c is defined relative to indices, rather than worlds:
C , w , c ,c p ô w P c(p)
C , w , c ,c ¬φ ô C , w , c .c φ
C , w , c ,c φ ^ ψ ô C , w , c ,c φ and C ,w , c ,c ψ
16Note that these are not equivalent to attitude reports such as (16b); both (17a) and (17b) could be
true even if Alpha does not realize it.
17This idea is inspired by a similar idea due to Gibbard (2003) for modeling normative discourse
and by to Barker (2002) and MacFarlane (2016) for modeling vagueness.
18A similar approach would be to use a two-dimensional framework (e.g., Crossley and Humber-
stone 1977; Stalnaker 1978; Davies and Humberstone 1980) and let the conventions be those used by
speakers in the world-as-actual. Counterconventionals could then be modeled as “counteractuals” or
“diagonalizing counterfactuals”, i.e., counterfactuals that reset the world-as-actual parameter to be
the world of evaluation. We do not opt for this approach for two reasons. First, counterconventional
interpretations can arise even if there are no speakers in the relevant counterfactual scenario. Thus,
this approach would incorrectly predict the following to sound marked:
(i) If Pluto were a planet, then even if there were no people, Ceres, Eris, etc. would be planets,
too.
Second, this simple two-dimensionalist approach predicts that counterconventional readings shift
the interpretation of ‘actually’ due to diagonalization. But then the following should sound false on
the counterconventional reading, since ‘actually’ in the consequent refers to the world of evaluation:
(ii) If Pluto were a planet, there would be many more planets in the solar system than there
actually are.
For these reasons, we think it’s better to not tie this convention parameter to the world-as-actual.
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C , w , c ,c φ _ ψ ô C , w , c ,c φ or C , w , c ,c ψ
C , w , c ,c φÑ ψ ô C , w , c ,c φ only if C , w ,c ψ
C , w , c ,c ◻φ ô for all v P W : C , v , c ,c φ
C , w , c ,c ◇φ ô for some v P W : C , v , c ,c φ
C , w , c ,c φ ψ ô for all 〈v , d〉 P f (~φC , w , c): C , v , d ,c ψ,
where ~φC B {〈w , c〉 P IW | C , w , c ,c φ }. Consequence is the preservation of
satisfaction over indices: Γ (c φ iff for every conventional model C  〈W, f 〉 and
every 〈w , c〉 P IW , if C , w , c ,c Γ, then C , w , c ,c φ.
Unlike the standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics or the impossible worlds se-
mantics, counterfactuals can shift the interpretation of atomics in the conventional
semantics. We assume, however, that ◻ and ◇ cannot. As a result, the con-
ventional semantics is hyperintensional. In particular, Vacuism does not hold:
¬◇φ *c φ ψ. However, Counterlogical Vacuism does hold (at least given
Success): if (c ¬φ, then ~φC  H, and so f (~φC , w , c)  H, for all C. In that
case, (c φ ψ.
Note that counterfactuals can simultaneously shift the world and the hypercon-
vention. This is by design; some counterfactuals need to shift both. For instance:
(18) If Plutowere a planet, astronomerswould be overwhelmed at having to keep
track of all the planets.
(18) seems true. But it is not true on a countersubstratum reading, since astronomers
would only have to keep track of one more planet if Pluto had cleared its orbital
neighborhood. Nor is it true on a “pure” counterconventional reading where the
hyperconvention is shifted but the “substratum” is held fixed, since astronomers are
not actually overwhelmed.19 So for (18) to receive a true reading, the counterfactual
needs to shift the world and hyperconvention simultaneously.
Which reading (countersubstratum, counterconventional, or something in be-
tween) a counterfactual receives is a context-sensitive matter. Specifically, it de-
pends on the features of the context that determine the selection function. Some
contexts will prioritize holding fixed our conventions, while others will prioritize
holding fixed the substratum. For instance, in a context where speakers are dis-
puting Pluto’s orbit, the meaning of ‘planet’ will likely be held fixed, whereas in
a context like that of (13) where speakers are disputing how Pluto is classified,
Pluto’s physical characteristics will likely be held fixed. This is exactly the kind of
context-sensitivity that counterfactuals are widely believed to exhibit.
With that said, we can regiment the difference between countersubstratums
and counterconventionals directly in our object language with a few additions. The
basic idea is to extend L to a hybrid logic where there are hybrid operators for each
19It is actually hard to find examples of pure counterconventionals in natural language, though
there may indeed be some. See Kocurek et al. 2020, pp. 18–19 for discussion.
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parameter of the index.20 Hybrid logic, as it is typically understood, is an extension
of basicmodal logic to include operators and terms for talking about specificworlds
directly in the object language. This involves making three additions to the simple
propositional modal language:
(i) new atomic formulas n1 , n2 , n3 , . . . known as nominals, which act like rigid
names for specific worlds (so n stands for “the current world is n”);
(ii) a unary operator @n (“according to n,. . . ”) for each nominal n, which resets
the world of evaluation to be the value of n;
(iii) a binding operator Ó n. (“letting n stand for the current world,. . . ”) for each
nominal n, which resets the value of n to be the world of evaluation.
We will make these additions for both worlds and hyperconventions. This will
allow us to regiment the idea of “holding fixed” one of the parameters.
More precisely, we extend L to a hybrid language LH with three kinds of atom-
ics: regular proposition letters p1 , p2 , p3 , . . ., state nominals s1 , s2 , s3 , . . . designating
worlds, and interpretationnominals i1 , i2 , i3 , . . .designatinghyperconventions. The
formulas of LH are summarized in Backus-Naur form as with L, except we add:
φ F ¨ ¨ ¨ | s | i | @s φ | @i φ | Ó s .φ | Ó i.φ.
The definitions of hyperconventions, indices, and conventional models are ex-
actly as before. A variable assignment over W is a function g that (i) maps
each state nominal s to a world in W , and (ii) maps each interpretation nomi-
nal i to a hyperconvention over W . Satisfaction is now defined relative to indices
and variable assignments. The semantic clauses for the old vocabulary are the
same as before except relativized to variable assignments. For example, where
~φC ,g  {〈w , c〉 P IW | C ,w , c , g ,c φ }:
C , w , c , g ,c φ ψ ô for all 〈v , d〉 P f (~φC ,g , w , c): C , v , d , g ,c ψ.
The clauses for the new vocabulary are as follows:
C , w , c , g ,c s ô g(s)  w
C , w , c , g ,c i ô g(i)  c
C , w , c , g ,c @s φ ô C , g(s), c , g ,c φ
C , w , c , g ,c @i φ ô C , w , g(i), g ,c φ
C , w , c , g ,c Ó s .φ ô C , w , c , gsw ,c φ
C , w , c , g ,c Ó i.φ ô C , w , c , g ic ,c φ,
20For more on hybrid logic, see Areces and ten Cate 2007.
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where gsw is the variable assignment just like g except gsw(s)  w, and similarly for g ic .
Consequence is preservation of satisfaction over indices and variable assignments.
One benefit of adding hybrid operators is that they allow us to regiment what
is often common ground in metalinguistic negotiations. While Alpha and Beta
disagree over (19a), both agree to (19b).
(19) a. Pluto is a planet.
b. According to Alpha’s use of the term, Pluto is a planet.
If we idealize a bit and assume that Alpha’s mental state can be associated with a
single hyperconvention,21 then we can regiment (19b) using @: where a stands for
Alpha’s hyperconvention and p stands for (19a), (19b) becomes @a p. And while
a Ñ (p Ø @a p) is a theorem of the conventional semantics, p Ø @a p is not. So for
Alpha, p and @a p coincide, since Alpha accepts a (i.e., Alpha accepts their own
definition of ‘planet’), whereas for Beta, they come apart since Beta does not accept
a. Thus, hybrid logic allows us to articulate explicitly, in the object language, where
disputants in a metalinguistic negotiation disagree.
These newhybrid expressions also allowus to regiment both countersubstratum
and counterconventional readings. To regiment a countersubstratum reading, we
can replace φ ψ with Ó i.((φ ^ i) ψ), where i occurs nowhere in φ or ψ.22
Intuitively, Ó i. saves the current hyperconvention to nominal i, and then conjoining
the antecedent with i ensures that this hyperconvention is “held fixed”. Thus,
Ó i.((φ ^ i) ψ) is true at 〈w , c〉 iff for all the closest worlds v such that φ is
true at 〈v , c〉, ψ is true at 〈v , c〉. Likewise, to regiment a (pure) counterconventional
reading, we can replace φψwith Ó s .((φ^s)ψ), where s occurs nowhere in φ
or ψ. Thus, Ó s .((φ^ s)ψ) is true at 〈w , c〉 iff for all the closest hyperconventions
d such that φ is true at 〈w , d〉, ψ is true at 〈w , d〉.
In the conventional semantics, counterpossibles are non-vacuous only on their
c-monstrous readings. The countersubstratum readings of counterpossibles are all
vacuous. So while ¬◇φ *c φ ψ, still ¬◇φ (c Ó i.((φ ^ i) ψ). If we
wanted, we could always add impossible worlds to our models to render counter-
possibles non-vacuous even on their countersubstratum readings. We will return
to this possibility in §7. For now, what the conventional semantics demonstrates
is that one can coherently maintain that counterpossibles are non-vacuous on their
counterconventional readingwithout being committed to their non-vacuity on their
countersubstratum reading.
21This idealization can be dropped by having interpretation nominals denote sets of hyperconven-
tions; we set this complication aside for ease of exposition.
22This formulation assumes Success. A more general regimentation that works even in the absence




In the previous section, we argued that metalinguistic negotiations and counter-
conventionals are closely connected. The sentences that express metalinguistic
disagreements are the very sentences that paradigmatically trigger counterconven-
tional interpretationswhen embedded in the antecedents of counterfactuals. So our
view that counterlogicals are counterconventionals pairs well with a view onwhich
disputes over logic are metalinguistic negotiations. In this section, wemotivate and
elaborate this view (though we won’t give a complete defense here).
One reason to think of disputes over logic as metalinguistic negotiations stems
fromQuine’s changing the subject objection (§3). Start with the following plausible
assumption (which we will take on board in what follows): it is constitutive of the
meaning of the connectives that they obey the laws that they do.23 Thus, when
the intuitionist denies the law of excluded middle, they thereby interpret negation
differently from the classicist. In that case, the question of how to interpret their
disagreement immediately arises. Everyone agrees that the law of excludedmiddle
holds according to classical logic but not according to intuitionistic logic. What, then,
are the two sides disagreeing about?
According to a realist interpretation, they are disagreeing aboutwhether the law
of excluded middle is correct, period.24 Just as Newtonian physics is a theory of the
movement of material bodies, so too classical and intuitionistic logic are theories
of negation, conjunction, and so on. No one doubted that the predictions of the
Newtonian theory are what they are. What was at issue was whether they were
correct. So too, what is at issue in disputes over logic is not what the predictions of
each logic are, but which logic makes the correct predictions.
This does not yet address the Quinean worry, however. A logic is always the
logic of a language. Before we can sensibly ask whether the law of excluded middle
holds, for example, we must specify what language we are talking about (recall the
case of Deviantsville). Quine’s objection is that there is no way of answering that
question without trivializing the debate. Since the laws governing the connectives
are plausibly constitutive of their meaning, the classical and non-classical logician
are necessarily making claims about different languages, and so talking past each
other. They cannot disagree without losing the sameness of subject matter required
23This assumption is not without controversy. As an anonymous reviewer points out, most metase-
mantic theories allow for two speakers to associate the same meaning with an expression despite
believing it to license different inferences. One who holds that “Amber is mean” follows from “Am-
ber is a cat” may be a monster, but he does not thereby mean something different by ‘cat’. Why
should logical expressions be any different? Can’t a non-classical logician weaken a law slightly (say,
to account for semantic paradoxes), without thereby adopting an entirely different connective from
the classical logicians, so long as the divergence remains relatively minor? Perhaps; in that case,
whether a particular dispute about logic is a metalinguistic negotiation would depend on how radical
the divergences are, and on whether the shared meaning builds in the laws (perhaps via externalist
means).




Another interpretation is that they are disputing whether the law of excluded
middle holds for a specific natural language, such as English. That is, the dispute is
over an empirical claim about the way people actually use ‘not’, ‘or’, etc., in English.
The classicist says English speakers use these words in accordance with the law
of excluded middle; the intuitionist denies this. This avoids the Quinean worry
by construing opposing logics as competing descriptive theories about the same
language.
Though many disputes over logic may seen this way, there are two reasons to
find it unsatisfactory as a universal interpretation of all logical disputes. First, it
does not explainwhy philosophers of logic would appeal to such esotericmatters as
semantic paradoxes, the epistemology of mathematics, computational complexity,
or quantum mechanics—matters mostly unknown to the vast majority of native
speakers—to justify their positions. None of those considerations are relevant to
the linguistic question of how ordinary speakers actually use logical vocabulary;
that’s a matter to be settled by surveys.25
Second, it fails to account for the normativity of logic.26 Logic is the study
of correct reasoning, not just the study of how people actually reason. The vast
majority of a given linguistic community could commit the fallacy of affirming the
consequent, and it would remain a fallacy. The fact that people tend to reason
in a particular way may constrain our theory of correct reasoning, but it cannot
completely determine it.
But there is a thirdoption: they are engaging in ametalinguistic negotiation. Yes,
the classicist and intuitionist associate different meanings with logical vocabulary,
and so are disagreeing fundamentally about meaning. But that does not mean the
two sides are “changing the subject”, or talking past each other. They disagree over
how to use the logical vocabulary, not over factual claims about how certain people
do use that vocabulary. In other words, logical disagreements express differences
over which inferences to count as valid.
This interpretation of logical disputes has close ties to earlier conventionalist
views of logic, such as those of Carnap (1937) and Ayer (1952). More recently,
Kouri Kissel (2018, 2019) has explicitly defended the idea that logical disputes are
metalinguistic negotiations. Inwhat follows,we lay out a version of this view,which
we call logical expressivism, on which logical assertions (e.g., that some inference
is valid or that some logic is correct) are expressions of the logical commitments of
the speaker, rather than factual claims either about an “objectively correct” logic,
or about the patterns of reasoning a specific group happens to employ.
25Logicians do sometimes appeal to ordinary linguistic judgments to justify their position; see
Ripley 2016 for discussion. A well-known example is the use of the paradoxes of material implication
as a motivation for relevance logics (Anderson and Belnap, 1975; Mares, 2012).
26Not everyone agrees that logic is normative in any important sense—see Harman 1984 for well-




Here is howwe are thinking about the view. At any given time, a speaker adopts
certain conventions for how to talk. In most conversations, speakers will converge
on a sizeable set of conventions, though they may disagree over edge cases, e.g.,
whether to use ‘planet’ to include Pluto. Metalinguistic negotiations are disputes
over such cases—that is, they concern what conventions to adopt rather than what
the extra-conventional world is like.
There is no such thing as a correct or incorrect convention. Nature does not
settle what the word ‘planet’ must mean; that’s our job. As Frege (1892) taught us,
“Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign
for something.”
Still, some conventions may be better or worse for certain purposes. Some might
fit more nicely with preexisting conventions, or be easier for us to use, or (in the
bad case) be offensive or harmful to a particular group of people. The fact that
we can decide which conventions to adopt does not imply that all conventions are
on a par.27 Speakers can meaningfully disagree over which conventions are better,
or which should be used, even if there is another sense in which our linguistic
conventions are arbitrary.
Logics are just conventions of a special sort: they are conventions governing the
use of words like ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘true’, ‘valid’, and so on. Nothing in principle
stops us from adopting a language governed by classical logic, intuitionistic logic,
paraconsistent logic, or even the trivial logic where everything is valid. Even so,
some logics are better than others and there can be reasonable disagreement over
which is better for specific purposes.28 Everyone will probably agree, for instance,
that the trivial logic is a bad logic to adopt. But not everyone will agree that
classical logic is the unique best logic for every application. There does not have to
be a “correct logic” for there to be genuine disagreements over logic, just as there
does not have to be a “correct convention” for there to be genuine disagreements
over convention.
Consider, as a case study, a dispute one might find in a seminar on paradoxes:
(20) Param: The Liar sentence is both true and not true.
Clara: No it’s not. The Liar sentence cannot be both true and not true
because no sentence can.
Param: I don’t accept the law of non-contradiction. The Liar paradox shows
that some contradictions are true.
Clara: Look, I know it’s tempting to blame the law of non-contradiction,
but there’s a good reason not to. Even if the Liar sentence were both
true and not true, Curry’s paradox would remain unresolved.
27For more on this point, see Haslanger 2000, 2005; McConnell-Ginet 2006, 2008; Plunkett and
Sundell 2013; Plunkett 2015.
28Putnam (1969, pp. 231–232) defends quantum logic along these lines.
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How should we think about what that disagreement in (20) is about? According to
logical expressivism, it is not about anything purely factual. Param is not asserting
that theLiar sentence is both true andnot true according to thewayEnglish speakers
tend to speak. Nor is he asserting that the Liar sentence is both true and not true in
some objective, language-transcendent sense. Instead, he is best viewed as making
a proposal to adopt a certain logical convention—that is, to use ‘not’, ‘and’, and
‘true’ in such a way as to make the Liar sentence count as both true and untrue.
To do this, he does not need to explicitly mention anything about words or
conventions. Indeed, doing so would change the force of his assertions. When
Param asserts (21a), he does not thereby assert (21b):
(21) a. The Liar sentence is both true and not true.
b. According to my logic, the Liar sentence is both true and not true.
Param and Clara agree on (21b), but disagree about (21a). Instead, Param expresses
(21b) by asserting (21a), much like one expresses that one believes p by asserting p,
without thereby asserting that one believes p. This is the sense in which the view
is a form of expressivism.
Logical expressivism respects the spirit of Quine’s changing the subject objec-
tion: two people cannot disagree about logic without thereby using words dif-
ferently. But that does not mean they are, as Quine thought, simply talking past
each other. Instead, their disagreement can be normative—they may be disagree-
ing about how to use the logical vocabulary. Logical disputants are engaging in a
normative, non-trivial debate, centered on exactly the kinds of concerns (semantic
paradoxes, vagueness, etc.) where the appropriateness of logical conventions is at
stake. So logical expressivism answers Quine’s challenge, while accounting both
for the normativity of logic and for the types of considerations philosophers of logic
raise in support of their views. These are all marks in its favor.
In addition to these theoretical virtues, logical expressivism is supported by
linguistic data. Contrast the following:
(22) a. I consider Pluto to be a planet.
b. #I consider Pluto to be more than 1022 kg.
AsKennedyandWiller (2016)point out, theverb ‘considers’ carries a “counterstance-
contingency” presupposition: pα considers φq is defined in a context only when φ
is contingent on some extra-factual matter like speakers’ tastes, or linguistic deci-
sions such as how to define a predicate. Thus, (22a) sounds fine in the context of
(13) because whether Pluto is (or counts as) a planet is contingent on whether we
adopt the IAU’s definition or the old definition. By contrast, (22b) sounds bad in
the context of (13) since whether Pluto is more than 1022 kg cannot be resolved by
stipulation.29
29This does not mean that (22b) sounds bad in every context. In some contexts, the mass of Pluto
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In a context like (20), (23a) and (23b) sound fine:
(23) a. I consider the Liar sentence to be both true and not true.
b. I consider the law of non-contradiction to be valid.
This indicates that in the context of (20), whether the Liar is both true and not true,
or whether the law of non-contradiction is valid, can be settled by stipulation. In
otherwords, we can choose to adopt a logic onwhich contradictions can be true or on
which the law of non-contradiction holds. Statements about logic are expressions
of these sorts of choices.
This does not mean that the truth of every assertion about logic can be settled
by fiat. Contrast (23a) and (23b) with:
(24) a. #I consider the Liar sentence to be both true and not true according to a
paraconsistent interpretation.
b. #I consider the law of non-contradiction to be valid in classical logic.
These sound terrible in the context of (20). That is because Param and Clara do not
disagree over what paraconsistent or classical logic are. It is not open to either of
them to decide what entails what on classical logic or whether the Liar sentence is
both true and not true on a paraconsistent interpretation (though perhaps in other
contexts, one could dispute these things).
Nor does it mean that speakers are logically omniscient—that they can know
every logical truth atwill. Speakers canbe (andoften are) committed to a convention
without realizing it. This canhappen if the speakermakes the convention they adopt
contingent onworldly facts. Someone could choose, for example, to adopt the IAU’s
definition of ‘planet’ without knowing what that definition is exactly. In that case,
it would be weird to say (22a), since the speaker cannot simply decide that Pluto
meets the IAU’s definition of ‘planet’.
The same goes for logical conventions. If a student in introductory logic is
working on a problem set, it would sound weird for them to say:
(25) #I consider the law of excluded middle to be valid.
In this context, the student (even if just for the purposes of the problem set) is
adopting the logic the problem set is asking about and is trying to determine what
laws are valid according to it. This leaves no room for decision: it is not an option for
them to choose what is valid according to that logic. Logical mistakes are possible
even if logic is settled by convention.
Finally, logical expressivism does not imply that logicians engaging in disputes
over logic must take themselves to be disputing how to use words, any more
might be something that can be settled at least partly by stipulation, e.g., if the boundaries of Pluto
are unclear or if there is disagreement over how to define a kilogram. The point is just that in the
context of (13), the mass of Pluto cannot be settled by stipulation.
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than normative expressivism implies participants in a moral disagreement must
take themselves to be non-cognitivists. The considerations that lead us to logical
expressivism have less to do with the self-understanding of logicians, and more
to do with reflections on the nature of logic as well as various kinds of linguistic
data that have been used more generally in philosophy of language to motivate
expressivism.
We do not claim at this point to have given definitive arguments in favor of
logical expressivism. A complete defense will have to be taken up elsewhere. We
have simplyprovided (to ourmind, compelling) reasons to take logical expressivism
seriously, and thus to take seriously the idea that many disputes over logic are best
viewed as metalinguistic negotiations.
6 A Counterconventional Semantics for Counterlogicals
We now present our counterconventional semantics for counterlogicals, which we
call the (logical) expressivist semantics. It extends the conventional semantics from
§4 to allow counterfactuals to shift the interpretation of both logical and non-logical
vocabulary.30 We then explain how this semantics addresses the Quinean objection.
The first step is relatively simple. Where W is a set of worlds, we redefine a
hyperconvention over W to be a function c such that:
(i) for each p P At, c(p) Ď W
(ii) for each n-place△ P {¬,^,_,Ñ,◻,◇}, c(△) : ℘ (W)n Ñ ℘ (W).
So in addition to assigning a set ofworlds to each atomic sentence, hyperconventions
assign intensions to the logical connectives, where the intension of a connective
is modeled as an operation on sets of worlds.31 As before, an index is just a
world-hyperconvention pair and the set of indices over W is IW . We will call a
hyperconvention classical if the following conditions are met for all X,Y Ď W :
c(¬)(X)  X c(^)(X,Y)  X X Y
c(◻)(X)  {w P W | X  W } c(_)(X,Y)  X Y Y
c(◇)(X)  {w P W | X ,H } c(Ñ)(X,Y)  X Y Y
An index is classical if its hyperconvention is classical. We let CIW be the set of
classical indices over W . An expressivist model is a pair of the form E  〈W, f 〉
30Similar semantic frameworks for knowledge and belief have been developed to address the
problem of logical omniscience. See, e.g., Muskens 1991; Williamson 2009, for examples. To our
knowledge, such approaches have not been extended to counterfactuals.
31Note that hyperconventions do not determine the interpretation of . Although we would
like to extend our semantics to allow for the interpretation of to shift, it is not clear how to do
this consistently. We cannot simply have hyperconventions assign an interpretation to, since
denotes an operation on sets of indices, which themselves contain hyperconventions. See Kocurek
2020 for a proposal to avoid this problem.
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where W ,H and f : ℘ (IW ) ˆ IW Ñ ℘ (IW ). The satisfaction relation,e is defined
as follows (△ P {¬,^,_,Ñ,◻,◇}):
E , w , c ,e p ô w P c(p)
E , w , c ,e △(φ1 , . . . , φn) ô w P c(△)(~φ1E ,c , . . . , ~φnE ,c)
E , w , c ,e φ ψ ô for all 〈v , d〉 P f (~φE , w , c): E , v , d ,e ψ,
where ~φE B {〈w , c〉 P IW | E , w , c ,e φ } and ~φE ,c  {w P W | E , w , c ,e φ }.
Note that if c is classical, then the clause for each member of {¬,^,_,Ñ,◻,◇} is
exactly the same as in the conventional semantics.
Consequence is the preservation of satisfaction over classical indices: Γ (e φ
iff for every expressivist model E and every 〈w , c〉 P CIW , if E , w , c ,e Γ, then
E , w , c ,e φ. This guarantees that (e obeys classical logic. Of course, if we
wanted, we could obtain a different base logic by redefining consequence accord-
ingly. We could, for instance, obtain a Kleene base logic by defining Kleene in-
dices by how they interpret the connectives (e.g., c(¬) is an operation where (i)
c(¬)(X) X X  H and (ii) c(¬)(c(¬)(X))  X), and then defining consequence as
satisfaction-preservation over Kleene indices.32 For ease of exposition, though, we
stick with classical logic as our base logic.
Given this notion of consequence, the impossible worlds semantics and the log-
ical expressivist semantics generate the same logic over L—that is, (i (e (§A).
Thus, anything the former can do, the latter can do as well. In particular, counter-
logicals are not vacuously true on the expressivist semantics.
The two frameworks render counterlogicals non-vacuous indifferentways, how-
ever. The impossible worlds semantics does it essentially by brute force: it simply
introduces impossibleworlds satisfyingwhatever sentences you like into themodel.
There are no rules governing how truth works at impossible worlds; truth is simply
determined by fiat.
By contrast, the expressivist semantics generates the non-vacuity of counterlog-
icals in amore systematic fashion. Truth is always determined compositionally: the
semantic value of a complex formula is always a function of the semantic value of its
parts. It is just that which function that is can vary in the scope of counterfactuals.
In effect, the expressivist semantics replaces impossible worlds with possible worlds
under different descriptions.
This difference can be made manifest in a hybrid language. Recall from §4
that counterpossibles are only non-vacuous on their c-monstrous readings in the
32This raises the question: which logics can be represented by a hyperconvention? The answer
depends on what “represent” means. Here is a natural suggestion: c represents a logic L in E just in
case φ1 , . . . , φn $L ψ iff for all w, if E , w , c ,e {φ1 , . . . , φn}, then E , w , c ,e ψ. Then it can be shown
that a logic is representable in any countably infinitemodel iff it is reflexive, transitive, monotonic, and
congruential, i.e., validates the replacement of logical equivalents (see Kocurek 2020 for the proof).
While this rules out the ability to represent certain substructural logics (e.g., non-monotonic logics),
these limitations can be lifted by employing other notions of representability. See Kocurek 2020 for
details. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this question.
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conventional semantics their countersubstratum readings are all vacuously true.
This was stated using hybrid operators: countersubstratums are counterfactuals of
the form Ó i.((φ^ i) ψ), and ¬◇φ (c Ó i.((φ^ i) ψ) even though in general
¬◇φ *c φ ψ. Similarly, in the expressivist semantics, counterlogicals are only
non-vacuous on c-monstrous readings. This can be stated using hybrid operators
as well though doing so requires a bit more work.
To illustrate, compare (3) and (11) with their respective regimentations in LH:
(3) If the Liar sentence were both true and not true, the moon would be made
of green cheese.
(l ^ ¬ l) m
(11) If the Liar sentence were both true and not true according to a classical
interpretation of negation and conjunction, the moon would be made of
green cheese.
Ó i.(@i(l ^ ¬ l) m)
Like the impossible worlds semantics, (l ^¬ l) m is not valid in the expressivist
semantics. This is because counterfactuals can shift the interpretation ^ and ¬ so
that l ^ ¬ l is true at some worlds. By contrast, Ó i.(@i(l ^ ¬ l) m) is valid in
the expressivist semantics. This is because the antecedent of the counterfactual is
forced by @i to be evaluated according to a classical hyperconvention.
Note that we cannot formalize countersubstratums as Ó i.((φ ^ i) ψ) in the
expressivist semantics, since the counterfactual can shift the interpretation of^ (so
φ ^ i might be true at an index even if i is not). But we can formalize them in the
expressivist semantics (given Success) as:
Ó i.(Ó j.@i(φ ^ j) ψ).
In the conventional semantics, this is equivalent to our original formulation of
countersubstratums, viz., Ó i.((φ^ i) ψ). The two come apart in the expressivist
semantics, but it is easy to check that Ó i.(Ó j.@i(φ ^ j) ψ) has the same truth
conditions in the expressivist semantics as Ó i.((φ^ i)ψ) has in the conventional
semantics. Thus, we can state the idea that counterlogicals are only non-vacuous on
their c-monstrous readings as follows: if (e ¬φ, then (e Ó i.(Ó j.@i(φ ^ j) ψ).
We can now see how our expressivist semantics addresses the Quinean objec-
tion. The objection is correct in that non-vacuous counterlogicals involve a change
in the meaning of the logical connectives. But that doesn’t imply that all counter-
logicals are vacuously true. Instead, the non-vacuous ones are simply countercon-
ventionals.
Is this counterlogical non-vacuism or counterlogical vacuism? It is hard to say,
for it draws a distinction that was not made when we introduced those labels. On
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the one hand,Counterlogical Vacuism does not hold on the expressivist semantics,
so in that sense, it is a non-vacuist view. On the other, proponents of counterlogical
vacuismoften argue as though they have specifically countersubstratum readings in
mind, and our theory predicts that all of those are vacuous. So our view is best char-
acterized as an intermediate position: it is non-vacuist about counterconventional
readings of counterlogicals but vacuist about countersubstratum readings.
To elaborate, there is a kind of confusion around what exactly a counterlogical
is. This is due to an ambiguity in the notion of a “logically impossible” antecedent.
To explain, we use a distinction due to Sandgren and Tanaka (2019), but phrased
slightly differently: distinguish claims that are actually logically impossible, i.e.,
according to the logic we actually adopt, from sentences that are counterfactually
logically impossible, i.e., according to a counterfactual logic. For example, the an-
tecedent of (3) is actually logically impossible, i.e., impossible by our lights, though
not counterfactually impossible, i.e., impossible by the lights of the counterfactual
logic in question. By contrast, the antecedent of (11) is counterfactually logically
impossible: even by the lights of the counterfactual logic, it is absurd.33
Whenwe talk about counterfactualswith “logically impossible antecedents”, we
must be careful to clarify the logic relative towhich the antecedent is considered log-
ically impossible. Our view is that counterfactuals whose antecedents are actually
logically impossible are not automatically vacuous, but those whose antecedents
are counterfactually logically impossible are. Counterlogical non-vacuism is right
if we use actually logical impossibility to define counterlogicals, while counterlog-
ical vacuism is right if we use counterfactual logical impossibility. Put in these
terms, the view seems quite sensible: it simply states that for a counterlogical to be
non-vacuous, its antecedent must be coherent by its own lights.
7 Counterpossibles
This paper has been a tale of two semantics. In the beginning, it was the impossible
worlds semantics. There, non-vacuous counterlogicals were explained by introduc-
ing logically impossible worlds, modeled as inconsistent and/or incomplete sets of
sentences, where the classical laws of logic need not apply. But this semantics is
prone to a kind of Quinean changing the subject objection: in order for counterlog-
icals to be interpreted non-vacuously, we have to reinterpret the logical vocabulary
so that their antecedents no longer express genuine logical impossibilities.
In response, we flipped this objection on its head and turned it into a theory.
33We still assume that φ is logically impossible according to a logic L if ¬φ is L-valid. But it is an
open question how to understand the notion of logical impossibility in certain non-classical logics.
For instance, in the strong Kleene 3-valued logicK3, no formula is valid. So by the current definition,
nothing is logically impossible in K3. As another example, in the logic of paradox LP, every formula
is true on some interpretation: even if φ is LP-valid, there are valuations satisfying ¬φ. So whether
the negation of a validity counts as a “logically impossibility” in LP is debatable. Thus, the very
notion of logical impossibility might become more complicated in non-classical settings.
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Counterfactuals, as we saw, are generally capable of shifting the conventional in-
terpretation of their constituents, especially in metalinguistics negotiations. We
then defended logical expressivism, according to which disputes over logic are best
thought of as metalinguistic negotiations and logical assertions as expressions of
the logical conventions speakers adopt.
This paved the way for a new, logical expressivist semantics. On this semantics,
non-vacuous counterlogicals are explained in terms of shifting conventions gov-
erning the logical vocabulary. Counterlogicals, when interpreted non-vacuously,
are simply counterconventionals. This vindicates the insight behind the Quinean
objection—that some sort of change of meaning is taking place in counterlogicals—
while preserving the felt non-vacuity of counterlogicals.
Thus, no separate theory of counterlogicals is required. We do not need to
introduce logically impossible worlds to accommodate non-vacuous counterlogi-
cals in our semantic theories. Non-vacuous counterlogicals come for free with a
semantics for convention-shifting expressions, which is already needed to explain
counterconventionals and other c-monstrous expressions.
Don’t we still need impossible worlds, though? After all, we still have to deal
with counterpossibles that are not counterlogicals, such as (5)–(7).
(5) If water were hydrogen peroxide, life would not exist.
(6) If Sam were a salmon, she would have wings.
(7) If Socrates had existed without his singleton, he would be sad.
The careful reader may have noticed that the expressivist semantics from §6 treats
all counterpossibles similarly to how it treats counterlogicals. Like counterlogi-
cals, counterpossibles are not vacuously true: ¬◇φ *e φ ψ. But also like
counterlogicals, counterpossibles are only non-vacuous on counterconventional
readings. On their countersubstratum readings, they are all vacuous: ¬◇φ (e
Ó i.(Ó j.@i(φ ^ j) ψ).
Yet it is far fromobvious that themost natural interpretations of (5)–(7) are really
counterconventional ones. We are not saying ‘If water were classified as hydrogen
peroxide,. . . ’ or ‘If Sam counted as a salmon,. . . ’. Rather, these counterpossibles
seem non-vacuous even on their countersubstratum readings. If that is right, then
we may need to add impossible worlds anyway to accommodate their apparent
non-vacuity. But if impossible worlds are already needed to account for non-
vacuous counterpossibles, why not just use the impossible worlds semantics for
counterlogicals, too? Doesn’t the fact that we need impossible worlds for other
counterpossibles cut against giving a different treatment of counterlogicals?
We think not, for two reasons. First, the argument runs both ways. Convention-
shifting is already needed to analyze counterconventionals, independently of coun-
terpossibles. Impossibleworlds are of no help in giving a systematic theory of coun-
terconventionals sincemost counterconventionals are not counterpossibles (e.g., the
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Pluto example, (14)). So the same argument can be used in favor of the expressivist
semantics: if convention-shifting is already needed to account for counterconven-
tionals, why not just use the expressivist semantics for counterlogicals, too?
Second, and more importantly, as we saw in §3, there are special reasons for
questioning the impossible worlds semantics for counterlogicals that don’t apply to
other counterpossibles. In the case of counterlogicals, there is a good case to bemade
that we are reinterpreting the logical vocabulary in the scope of the counterfactual;
we do not mean classical conjunction and negation by ‘and’ and ‘not’ in (3). Maybe
this applies to other kinds of counterpossibles too, such as counteranalyticals (‘If
there were round squares,. . . ’) or countermathematicals (‘If Fermat’s last theorem
had failed,. . . ’). It is less clear, however, that any change of meaning is taking place
in countermetaphysicals such as (5)–(7).
At any rate, there are reasons to think that logic has a closer connection to
meaning and convention than other kinds of metaphysical claims. Whether Sam
is a salmon does not seem to be a matter of convention or subject to stipulation in
the same way that the meanings of the logical connectives are. So it is not ad hoc
to take a kind of disjunctive approach, using convention-shifting to model some
counterpossibles, e.g., counterlogicals, while using impossible worlds to model
others, e.g., countermetaphysicals.
With all that said, we are sympathetic to a more radical view of impossible
worlds—one that does not give separate accounts of logical and non-logical impos-
sibility, but instead views impossible worlds of all sorts through the lens of shifting
conventions. On this view, impossibleworlds are not separate entities frompossible
worlds; impossible worlds are just possible worlds under different descriptions. This
would open the door to a novel account of counterpossibles, one that aims to strike
a balance between vacuism and non-vacuism. In short: counterpossibles are only
non-vacuous on counterconventional readings, whereas they are all vacuous on a
countersubstratum reading. While we do not have space to defend this view in
full, we nevertheless wish to close by expressing optimism for this more ambitious
project.
This account of impossible worlds is not original to us. It is defended in various
forms in the literature on imagining the impossible. Many philosophers have
argued that we cannot imagine the impossible precisely because whenever we try
to do so, we end up imagining a possible scenario that we simply describe in an
impossible-sounding way.34 For instance, Kripke (1971, 1980) claims that when we
try to imagine a world where Hesperus is distinct from Phosphorus, we end up
imagining something else—that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are used to refer to
distinct individuals, that the evening star and the morning star are distinct, etc.
These are not really worlds where Hesperus, as we use the term, is distinct from
Phosphorus, as we use the term. We confuse ourselves into thinking otherwise due
to an implicit meaning change.
34For discussion, see Yablo 1993; van Inwagen 1998; Gregory 2007; Kung 2010, 2016.
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But there is another way to see things. Some philosophers, such as Kung (2010,
2016), have held that it is actually quite easy to imagine the impossible: all it is to
imagine the impossible is to imagine a scenario that represents some impossible
proposition being true.35 Imagination, on this view, involves constructing a kind
of representation of a world. We never imagine a world directly but only under a
description or mode of presentation. As Kung (2010, pp. 626–628) puts it, we attach
“labels” to various items of our representation.
Moreover, this view of counterpossibles as counterconventionals is reminiscent
of other views in the literature. Vetter (2016) argues that counterpossibles are only
non-vacuous on epistemic, representation-sensitive readings of counterfactuals.
More directly related, Locke (2019) defends the view that “metaphysical counter-
possibles function to illustrate or express changes, or consequences of changes, to
the actual constitutive rules that govern language use while remaining in the object
languagewhere terms are used rather thanmentioned.” (p. 8)While Locke does not
subscribe specifically to the view that impossible worlds are possible worlds under
different descriptions, his view that impossible worlds talk is an “object language
resource for “mis-using” language” (p. 11) closely resembles the kind of view we
are sketching here.
On this picture, even countermetaphysicals such as (5)–(7) can ultimately be
viewed as counterconventionals. When evaluating (5), for instance, we imagine
a scenario where our lakes and oceans are filled with hydrogen peroxide, which
we stipulate to be “water”. When evaluating (6), we consider a scenario involving
a salmon that we (as the supposer) stipulate to be “Sam”. When evaluating (7),
we stipulate some set-like abstract objects, whose existence are not entailed by the
existence of their members, to be “sets”. In each case, we are shifting what we
actually mean by the relevant expression (‘water’, ‘Sam’, or ‘singleton’). For sure,
there are details to be ironed out. But we think there is promise in this general
strategy for understanding the underlying mechanics of counterpossibles.
Note this does not mean counterpossibles are about language in any meaningful
sense. It just means that they involve shifts in language. So ‘if water were hydrogen
peroxide,. . . ’ does not mean the same thing as ‘if water were classified as hydrogen
peroxide,. . . ’. The former shifts the labels we actually use; the latter describes what
labels are used in other counterfactual scenarios. Counterconventionals are no
more about linguistic conventions than quantifiers are about variable assignments.
Let’s end where we began: with Cohen’s difficult question.
(1) If the failure of modus ponens implied the failure of modus tollens, and
modus ponens were to fail, would modus tollens fail too?
We now have an answer: it depends. There are two readings of the question. On
a countersubstratum reading, the answer is yes: holding fixed what we mean by
35See also Berto 2017.
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‘implies’, any scenario where the failure of modus ponens implies the failure of
modus tollens and where modus ponens fails must be a scenario where modus
tollens fails. On a counterconventional reading, however, the answer is no: even
though modus ponens is actually valid, it is not counterfactually valid, i.e., valid
according to the counterfactual conventions expressed by the antecedent. Both
readings are readily available, which explainswhywe feel pulled in both directions.
The question was difficult to answer only because it was ambiguous.
A Appendix
In this appendix, we establish that the impossible worlds semantics and the expres-
sivist semantics generate the same logic over L, i.e., that (i (e. To do this, we
establish the following:
Theorem A.1.
(a) For any expressivist model E  〈W, f 〉 and any x P IW , there is a
impossible worlds model E i  〈W i , Pi , f i ,V i〉 and a w P W i such that
for all φ P L:
E , x ,e φ ô E i ,w ,i φ.
When x P CIW , we can take w P Pi.
(b) For any impossible worlds model I  〈W, P, f ,V〉 and any w P W ,
there is a expressivist model Ie  〈We , f e〉 and an x P IWe such that
for all φ P L:
I , w ,i φ ô Ie , x ,e φ.
When w P P, we can take x P CIWe .
Corollary A.2. For any Γ Ď L and φ P L, Γ (i φ iff Γ (e φ.
It is easiest to establish Theorem A.1(a) first.
Proof (TheoremA.1(a)): Suppose first that x P CIW . Define E i  〈W i , Pi , f i ,V i〉
as follows:
• W i  IW
• Pi  W ˆ {cx}
• for each y P W i and X Ď W i, f i(X, y)  f (X, y)
• for each y P Pi, V i(p , y)  1 iff wy P cy(p)
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• for each y < Pi, V i(φ, y)  1 iff E , y ,e φ.
Clearly, E i is a impossible worlds model and x P Pi. It suffices to show that
for any φ and any y P IW :
E , y ,e φ ô E i , y ,i φ.
If y < Pi, then by construction, E i , y ,i φ iff V i(φ, y)  1 iff E , y ,e φ. If
y P Pi, then we proceed by induction. The atomic case holds by definition
of V i. The other cases are straightforward since cy  cx is classical and since
Pi  W ˆ {cx}.
Now suppose x < CIW . Then we can define E i as above except now we
take Pi  CIW . Then E , x ,e φ iff E i , x ,i φ by construction of V i. ∎
TheoremA.1(a) is not terribly surprising in retrospect. All it says is that anything
that is i-valid is also e-valid. But i-validity is prettyweakwithout further constraints.
One way to make that clear is to observe that, as far as the logic is concerned,
counterfactuals behave exactly like distinct atomic sentences.
Definition A.3. An L-formula is an S5-formula if it does not contain.
An L-formula is a counterfactual if its main connective is.
Proposition A.4. Let M  〈P, i〉 be an S5-model (where i(p) Ď P for all
p P At) and letΦ : P Ñ ℘ (L)map every w P P to a setΦw of counterfactuals.
Then there is an impossible worlds model I  〈W, P, f ,V〉 such that for any
w P P:
(i) if φ is an S5-formula, then I , w ,i φ iffM ,w ,S5 φ
(ii) if ψ is a counterfactual, then I , w ,i ψ iff ψ P Φw .
Proof : WLOG, we may assume that P is disjoint from L and from (L ˆ P).
Define I  〈P Y L Y (L ˆ P), P, f ,V〉, where:
• for each p P At and w P P, V(p , w)  1 iff w P i(p)
• for each φ P L and α P L, V(φ, α)  1 iff α  φ
• for each φ P L and 〈α, w〉 P (L ˆ P), V(φ, 〈α, w〉)  1 iff α φ P Φw
• f is any selection function with the following property: if XXL  {α}
and w P P, then f (X, w)  {〈α, w〉}.
It is easy to establish (i) by induction. As for (ii), note that ~αI X L  {α},
so f (~αI , w)  {〈α, w〉}. Hence, I , w ,i α β iff I , 〈α, w〉 ,i β, i.e.,
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V(β, 〈α, w〉)  1, which holds iff α β P Φw . ∎
Corollary A.5. Let θ be any consistent S5-formula, and let θ˚ be the result
of simultaneously uniformly substituting one or more atomic sentences in θ
for distinct counterfactuals. Then θ˚ is i-satisfiable.
Proof : Let q1 , . . . , qn be the atomics in θ that are substituted for distinct
counterfactuals ψ1 , . . . , ψn resulting in θ˚. Since θ is consistent, it is S5-
satisfiable. Let M , w ,S5 θ. For each v P WM , define:
Φv B {ψi | M , v ,S5 qi }
By Proposition A.4, this guarantees us an S5-equivalent impossible worlds
modelI such thatI , v ,i ψ iffψ P Φv whereψ is a counterfactual. Moreover,
in this model, I , v ,i ◻(qi ” ψi). And since I , w ,i θ, it follows that
I , w ,i θ˚. ∎
CorollaryA.5 effectively says that there are nonon-trivial valid inferences governing
counterfactuals in the impossible worlds semantics: any inference with counterfac-
tuals that’s i-valid is already S5-valid.
Theorem A.1(b) is harder to establish. The main issue is that while hypercon-
ventions are allowed to redefine the semantic value of the boolean connectives, they
cannot touch the semantics of. But in the impossibleworlds semantics, any set of
L-formulas is satisfied at some (perhaps impossible) world in some model, includ-
ing those containing counterfactuals. Thus, if we are to establish Theorem A.1(b),
we need to establish the expressivist analogue of Proposition A.4. Indeed, this can
be done, though the proof is more involved.
Proposition A.6. LetM  〈W, i〉 be an S5-model and let Φ : W Ñ ℘ (L)map
every w P W to a set Φw of counterfactuals. Then there is a expressivist
model E  〈W, f 〉 and a classical hyperconvention c such that for any w P W :
(i) if φ is an S5-formula, then E , w , c ,e φ iffM ,w ,S5 φ
(ii) if ψ is a counterfactual, then E , w , c ,e ψ iff ψ P Φw .
Proof : Since S5 is invariant under bisimulation contraction (and so, invariant
under duplication of worlds), we may assume WLOG that W is infinite. We
define c simply as the classical hyperconvention over W where c(p)  i(p)
for all p P At.
We now set out to define f . Fix an arbitrary w0 P W . Let h : L Ñ
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W´ {w0 , w} be a bĳection. We’ll write wφ in place of h(φ) throughout. Now,
let Γ Ď L. Define the hyperconvention cΓ as follows (where ‹ P {¬,◻,◇}
and ˝ P {^,_,Ñ}):
cΓ(p) 
{




{w‹φ | wφ P X } Y {w0} if ‹φ P Γwhenever wφ P X
{w‹φ | wφ P X } otherwise
cΓ(˝)(X,Y) 

{wφ˝ψ | wφ P X and wψ P Y } Y {w0} if φ ˝ ψ P Γ whenever
wφ P X and wψ P Y
{wφ˝ψ | wφ P X and wψ P Y } otherwise
Let Γα  {β | α β P Γ }. Define f as follows:
f (X, w0 , cΓ)  {〈w0 , cΓα〉 | 〈wα , cΓ〉 P X }
f (X, wφ , cΓ) 
{
{〈wβ , cΓ〉} if φ  α β and 〈wα , cΓ〉 P X
IW otherwise
f (X, w , c)  {〈w0 , cΦαw 〉 | 〈wα , cΦw 〉 P X }
f (X, w , d)  X for any other d.
Let E  〈W, f 〉. It is easy to check that (i) holds by induction. So we just need
to establish (ii). First, some intermediate claims:
Claim (1): For any Γ and any φ, ψ: E , wφ , cΓ , ψ iff φ  ψ.
Proof : By induction. The atomic case holds by definition of cΓ. The
cases for the connectives is straightforward. For the counterfactual,
E , wφ , cΓ , α β iff f (~αE , wφ , cΓ) Ď ~βE . By induction hy-
pothesis, 〈wγ , cΓ〉 P ~βE iff γ  β. Hence, ~βE , IW , which means
f (~αE , wφ , cΓ) Ď ~βE iff f (~αE , wφ , cΓ)  {〈wβ , cΓ〉}, which holds
iff φ  αβ and 〈wα , cΓ〉 P ~αE . But again by induction hypothesis,
〈wα , cΓ〉 P ~αE . Thus, E , wφ , cΓ , α β iff φ  α β. ∎
Claim (2): For any Γ and any φ: E , w0 , cΓ , φ iff φ P Γ.
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Proof : By induction. The atomic case holds by definition of cΓ. The
cases for the connectives is straightforward using Claim (1). For the
counterfactual, E , w0 , cΓ , α β iff f (~αE , w0 , cΓ) Ď ~βE . By
Claim (1), 〈wγ , cΓ〉 P ~αE iff γ  α. So f (~αE , w0 , cΓ)  {〈w0 , cΓα〉}.
Hence, E ,w0 , cΓ , α β iff E , w0 , cΓα , β. But again by induction
hypothesis, this holds iff β P Γα, i.e., α β P Γ. ∎
Weare now ready to prove (ii). E , w , c , αβ iff f (~αE , w , c) Ď ~βE . By
Claim (1), 〈wγ , cΦw 〉 P ~αE iff γ  α. Hence, f (~αE , w , c)  {〈w0 , cΦαw 〉}.
So E , w , c , α β iff E , w0 , cΦαw , β, which by Claim (2) holds iff β P Φαw ,
i.e., α β P Φw . ∎
Corollary A.7. Let θ be any consistent S5-formula, and let θ˚ be the result
of uniformly substituting one or more atomic sentences in θ for distinct
counterfactuals. Then θ˚ is e-satisfiable.
Now we can establish Theorem A.1(b):
Proof (Theorem A.1(b)): Let I  〈W, P, f ,V〉 and first let w P P. Let:
Φ  {φ | φ is an S5-formula and I , w ,i φ }
Ψ  {φ | φ is a counterfactual and I , w ,i φ } .
By Proposition A.6, there is a expressivist model Ie  〈W, f e〉 and a classical
hyperconvention c such thatIe , w , c ,e ΦYΨ and if φ is a counterfactual not
inΨ,Ie , w , c .e φ. Hence, by a simple induction,I , w ,i φ iffIe , w , c ,e φ.
Now let w < P. Let Γ  {φ | V(φ, w)  1 } and let Ie be 〈W, f 〉 where f
is constructed as in Proposition A.6. Then by Claim (2), Ie , w0 , cΓ ,e φ iff
φ P Γ. Hence, we can take s  〈w0 , cΓ〉. ∎
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